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PERPETUITIES PROBLEMS OF THE
GENERAL PRACTITIONER
BERTEL M. SPARKS"

Any discussion of the Rule Against Perpetuities before a body of
practicing lawyers is a challenging as well as an exciting undertaking.
I am well aware that the rule is one of the most distasteful subjects
that can possibly be mentioned to many members of the bar. But I
am also aware of a surprisingly active interest in the rule that has been
generated in recent years. Most of this interest has been expressed
in rather vigorous and emphatic terms. Such expressions as "ending
the rule's reign of terror,"' "staying the slaughter of the innocents,"2
and other equally colorful tags have been used. 3 It seems that ardent
followers can be found for almost any point of view one chooses to
express. At least followers can be found until someone else expresses
an opposite point of view in equally forceful language, and then the
allegiance can be quickly transferred. I have sometimes felt that many
of the things said about the Rule Against Perpetuities were said in
jest the first time they were spoken but that so many people took them
seriously that the jester himself became convinced of their authenticity.
RECOGNtiON OF THE PROBLEMS

If we are to discuss the perpetuities problems of the general practitioner, it is necessary that we first reconcile ourselves to the fact that
the general practitioner has perpetuities problems. This is something
many lawyers are unwilling to do. Almost every day I find myself
talking with lawyers who can discuss the most intricate corporate re*This article is based upon an address delivered before the Real Property
Institute of The Florida Bar on Oct. 21, 1955, and reported here with only slight

revision by the author.
**B.S. 1938, Eastern Kentucky State College; LL.B. 1948, University of Kentucky;
LL.M. 1949, S.J.D. 1955, University of Michigan; Professor of Law, New York University.
"Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective:Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,65 HAv.

L. REv. 721 (1952).
2

Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REv. 35

(1952).
3E.g., Simes, Is the Rule Against PerpetuitiesDoomed?, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 179

(1953).

[465]
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organization problems imaginable with an air of familiarity or who
are ready to face all sorts of complicated equitable conversion situations with complete confidence. Some of them will even admit that
they can understand a few sections of the Internal Revenue Code. If
I mention the Rule Against Perpetuities to these same men they tend
to freeze up. They say, "I don't know a thing about that," "I have
never had occasion to use the rule," or "My practice does not lie in

that field." Some of these fellows will declare in a tone that is almost
boastful that they know nothing about the Rule Against Perpetuities
and, further, that in their entire practice they have never had a case
involving a future interest. Each time I hear this latter declaration
a whole series of questions comes to my mind. Did that man ever
draft a deed or a will? Did he ever handle the probate of an estate?
Did he ever examine a title or represent a buyer in a real estate transaction? Did he ever hear a client say, "I would like for my little home
over on Water Street or my farm up on Opossum Ridge to pass to
my children when my wife dies"? If he has not had any of these experiences has he ever practiced law? And if he has had these experiences how in the name of common sense can he say that he has
never had a case involving a future interest? The chances are that our
friend who claims he has never had a case involving future interests
is a man who is either unwilling or unable to recognize future interests
problems when he sees them. His clients bring him such problems
but he ignores them, and his clients suffer as a result.
I trust that in an assembly of real property lawyers there is no one
present who does not realize that the Rule Against Perpetuities is a
thing that cannot be avoided. It is constantly with us. Even after
we recognize this fact there is something more that we must do before
we begin an analysis of the rule's meaning and application. It is neces4
sary that we first know something about the policy behind the rule.
Why do we have it? What is its purpose? What social interests are
served by it? What goals are we as lawyers - as leaders in the society
in which we live - seeking to attain through this rule? I know that
this inquiry into the policy or the philosophy of a particular rule of
law has little appeal to some members of the profession. Nevertheless,
I make no apology for spending at least some time considering this
aspect of the question. You may insist that what you want is a rule
book - that you are not concerned with reasons why the rules exist.
4For an excellent treatise analyzing the policy of the rule see SiNsts, PuBLIC
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955).
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You may tell me that all you are looking for is a knowledge of how
to play the game. My answer to you is that you will never play the
game successfully until you know where the goal posts are.
DEAD HAND CONTROL VERSUS LIVING CONTROL

The goal posts of the perpetuities game are to be found in the
Anglo-American concept of private property. The salient fact there
is that that concept includes an entity known as a future interest. It
is recognized that a property owner has a power, and in fact a right,
to divide his property both vertically and horizontally. He is permitted to split his property into successive interests as well as into
concurrent interests. The moment he divides it into successive interests
he creates a future interest. When John Smith disposes of Blackacre
by saying, "I give Blackacre to my wife, Susan, for life and upon her
death to my son, Edward," he has created two successive interests in
Blackacre. Susan has a present interest and Edward a future interest.
In the process of dividing his property into these successive interests
the owner is permitted to leave some uncertainty as to who shall
eventually own some or all of those interests. Instead of saying, "I
give Blackacre to my wife, Susan, for life and upon her death to my
son, Edward," he might say, "I give Blackacre to my wife, Susan, for
life and upon her death to such of my lineal descendants as shall be
living when Susan dies," or "to such of my children as Susan shall by
will appoint." In these instances it cannot presently be determined
who will own Blackacre after Susan's death. That is to be determined
by subsequent events. In this situation John Smith, the original owner
of Blackacre, is dead. He is no longer a member of society. He no
longer has rights and is no longer subject to duties. Yet it is his word
which says that the ultimate owners of Blackacre cannot be determined
at this time. Our customs, our mores, and the laws that we have established demand that property owners be permitted to make this
kind of disposition. We almost instinctively recognize this right as
a necessary incident to property ownership. What we often fail to
realize is that a recognition of this right means permitting the hand
of a bygone day and a voice that has already been stilled by death to
dictate the distribution of the wealth of the present generation. To
what extent should this control by the dead be permitted? If left completely uncontrolled it would be possible to have a situation in which
substantially all the economic goods in the world at a given time would
be controlled by the past, a situation in which the living generation
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would be without a voice in the distribution of the world's assets.
Thus we have two concepts of freedom clashing with each other.
On the one hand we have the doctrine that the individual should be
free to dispose of his property in the manner he sees fit. On the other
we have the notion that each generation should be free to control
the wealth of its own age unhindered by the dictates of the past. As
long as we think of these two great principles of human freedom in
the abstract we are likely to think of each of them as absolutes. As
soon as we put them into concrete form we see them clashing with
each other and we realize that they, like most principles of human
conduct, are necessarily relative. The Rule Against Perpetuities is
a device invented by Anglo-American lawyers to regulate this inevitable clash. The rule represents a compromise between a wholesome
respect for the dead and the freedom of the present to work out its own
destiny. Its purpose is to define the boundaries of that compromise.
The question to be determined is, how long shall property interests
be permitted to remain contingent? Stated in more sociological terms
the question might be, to what extent should the dead be permitted
to overrule the will of the living?
The Rule Against Perpetuities answers this question by saying
that the period of this contingency cannot be longer than lives in being
and twenty-one years. As expressed in John Chipman Gray's great
classic on the subject, it is a rule in law that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some
life in being at the creation of the interest." The rule is simple in
statement but extremely treacherous in its application. It is my belief
that its treachery arises out of the failure of lawyers to admit its
simplicity. The rule will be mastered when lawyers recognize it as a
rule of drafting, and when they become willing to measure every limitation that they create, whether by deed or by will, by the express
words that the rule declares. The skill of the property lawyer should
be demonstrated at the drafting table rather than in the courtroom.
Let's face it: When we bring an instrument that we have drafted into
court we are in effect saying, "Judge, I failed to render my client the
services for which he paid me; I wonder if you would help me finish
the job." Stated in that form, your difficulty may sound embarrassing;
stated in any other form it is probably unrealistic.
5GRAy, THE RULE AGAINST PEPErurrIEs §201 (4th ed. 1942). For a rather condensed, but lucid, exposition of the rule see Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51

HARv. L. REV. 638 (1938).
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An analysis of the rule's requirements might well begin by emphasizing that it is a rule placing a restriction upon the duration of
contingencies surrounding property interests. There is no restriction
upon the duration of the interests themselves. The words of the rule
are that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all," within the
period of the rule. When John Smith devises Blackacre to his wife,
Susan, for life with remainder to his son, Edward, a future interest
has been created. However, that future interest is a vested remainder
in Edward; consequently, the rule has no application. If John devises
Blackacre to his wife, Susan, for life with remainder to such of John's
lineal descendants as shall be living at Susan's death, a contingent
interest has been created. This interest might never vest. It is possible
that no lineal descendant of John will survive Susan. It is dear, however, at the time of the creation of the estate that if it ever vests it
will vest at Susan's death; therefore, the rule has not been transgressed.
John may just as easily provide by his will that his property shall be
held in trust, with income distributed equally among his children
until the death of the last surviving child. He may further provide that
upon the death of that last surviving child the trust shall continue for
an additional twenty-one years, with income distributed equally
among his grandchildren, and that upon the expiration of the twentyone-year period the corpus shall be distributed per stirpes among
John's then living lineal descendants. The gift is good. John's children will necessarily be in being at his death, and all interests will
be vested within twenty-one years after the death of the last surviving

child.
TYPICAL ERRORS IN DRAFTING

But the problems faced in the day-to-day practice of law do not
concern themselves primarily with the spinning of theories designed
to justify the longest possible postponement of the vesting of future
interests. It is only on very rare occasions that you will have a client
who actually wants to create these extremely remote contingencies.
When you do have such a client he is likely to be so eccentric that you
would like to be rid of him were it not for the fact that he is also
likely to be wealthy. The emphasis that has been placed upon these
extreme situations by legal writers of the past is probably the very
thing that has led many lawyers into believing that the Rule Against
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Perpetuities is unrelated to the actual practice of law. You might
truthfully say that you have never had a client who wanted to bequeath his fur-lined snuff box to his eldest male descendant who
should be living when Saint Paul's Church ceases to exist. But you are
not justified in concluding from that that you never had a case involving the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The problem to be faced in the routine of your daily practice is
that of examining every deed or will you draft in the light of the rule's
requirements. Before you treat any document as finished ask yourself
at least one simple question: Will the nature of every interest created
by this instrument be finally and definitely determined and the person
or persons entitled to take finally and definitely ascertained within
lives in being and twenty-one years?
It is my firm conviction that most of the perpetuities problems
that have been before the courts have resulted from the failure of
lawyers to realize that they had even created a future interest. Many
problems would be eliminated if lawyers would realistically accept the
simple fact that when they make a present transfer of a property
interest with enjoyment postponed they have created a future interest.
There are possibly those who will say that they have no problem here
but that they can never figure out this business about lives in being.
They will ask how they are to determine who are the measuring lives.
The best answer to that is that you may determine the measuring
lives any way you desire. Do the lives have to be named in the instrument? No. Do the lives have to be lives of persons taking an interest
under the will or deed? No. Is there a limit to the number of lives?
No, not so long as they are reasonably ascertainable.6

Instead of

searching for measuring lives it will probably be more profitable to
concentrate on an examination of the property interest you are creating.
The proper question to ask is: Can I point to some person or persons
now living and say that this interest will by the very terms of its
creation be vested in an identified individual within twenty-one years
after that person dies?
Let's get away from the odd or eccentric individuals and bring
in Mr. Average Client and see what he wants- see if he has any
perpetuities problems. Mr. Average Client is 65 years of age. He is
not what we would call wealthy but he is moderately well to do. He
has five adult children. He tells you that he is getting ready to retire
6As to each of these questions see In re Villar, [1929] 1 Ch. 243; Thellusson v.
Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805).
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and that he figures that his retirement income will be sufficient to
take care of him for the rest of his life. He tells you further that his
estate is not large enough to enable him to provide completely for
any of his children but that he would like to use it to supplement the
incomes of each of them as best he can. He further tells you that his
children are already in the process of rearing their own families and
that he would like to see them get all he can provide for them right
now when they need it most. He earned his money the hard way and
he does not believe in letting his children have very much at any one
time. He would like to make a present transfer of the bulk of his
estate to a trustee with directions to distribute income equally among
his children until the death of the last surviving child, with remainder
to such of his lineal descendants as shall then be living. His plan
sounds so reasonable that you are likely to prepare a trust deed putting
it into effect without any further thought on the matter. If you do
you will violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Although a disposition
of this kind would be good by will, it is bad by deed. The deed takes
effect immediately, but the gift over to lineal descendants cannot vest
until the death of Mr. Average Client's last surviving child. Mr.
Average Client might have another child. This afterborn child might
be the last survivor, but it is not a present life in being.
You may say that the probability of this 65-year-old man's having
further children is so remote that it can be ignored. Many have said
that this conclusive presumption in favor of the possibility of issuer
is so ridiculous that it merely demonstrates the unreasonableness of
the rule itself. They say that it makes the rule too complicated. On
the contrary, it is in reality a demonstration of the simplicity of the
rule. The requirement does not lend itself to any doubts or speculation.
Every interest must vest within the prescribed period. If you keep that
fact in mind you can, by careful drafting, give Mr. Average Client
exactly what he wants. All you have to do is to expressly provide in
the trust deed that when you say children you mean the five children
now living. If you are explicit on this point your perpetuities problems
in this particular case will be solved.8
7Owings v. Owings, 247 S.W.2d 221 (Ky. 1952); Trenton Banking Co. v. Hawley,
7 N.J. Super. 201, 70 A.2d 896 (1950); Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep.
1186 (1787).
8The fact that the court will never presume the impossibility of issue does
not prevent the testator from making such a presumption, and the testator's presumption will be given effect if it is either expressed or implied in the instrument.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Pearson, 140 Conn. 332, 99 WA.2d 224 (1953).
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Maybe our Mr. Average Client is not sufficiently average. After
all, he had enough wealth to set up a trust to pay at least some income
to each of five children. Let us take one of more modest circumstances.
We will call this one Joe Doakes. Joe says that all he has is forty acres
of swamp land, a run-down shack, two razor-backed hogs, and an old
roan cow. Joe has one son, Sam. Sam is married, but Joe tells you that
Sam is somewhat irresponsible. Joe wants Sam to get the forty acres,
but he is afraid he cannot trust him to hold on to it. Sam is likely
to sell it and move to Miami. Then Sam's children would be deprived
of this valuable ancestral home. You suggest giving Sam a life estate
with remainder to his wife, Mary. Joe feels that would be worse than
ever. He says that after all the female of the species is not a rational
animal anyway and that there is little telling what she might do with
this property if she ever gets her hands on it. He further says that he
does want Sam's wife to have the use of the property in case she survives Sam. You then suggest a gift to Sam for life, then to Mary for
life, with remainder to such of Sam's children as shall be living at
Mary's death. That sounds pretty good. You get the will all ready
for execution, and Joe comes in a few days later for the final act. Like
all thoughtful draftsmen, you read the document over to Joe. Joe
is really impressed with the idea of having his name signed to such
a formal and legalistic document. Just as he is about to sign his name
he says, "You know, Sam and Mary are not getting along very well
here lately. They just might get a divorce. In case they should and
in case Sam should get married again I would really want to benefit
Sam's surviving widow rather than his divorcee." You get busy and
rewrite the will so as to make the gift to Sam for life, remainder to
Sam's surviving wife for life, with remainder upon the death of
such surviving wife to Sam's then living children. This seems to take
care of all eventualities - except one. The gift to children violates
the Rule Against Perpetuities. These children cannot be identified
until the death of Sam's surviving widow. Right now we do not know
who Sam's surviving widow is going to be. She might possibly be a
person not yet born. 9 Now all this can be corrected by providing
that the gift to Sam's surviving widow is to take effect if, but only if, she
is a person living at the death of the testator. Such a provision is
sure to be satisfactory to the testator, for he will feel reasonably sure
that Sam is not going to marry a girl who does not meet that qualification anyway.
9Keefer v. McCloy, 344 Ill. 454, 176 N.E. 743 (1931).
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By now you are probably saying to yourself, "These family arrangements are all too complicated." You are going to stick with
wealthy bachelors and kind old widows. You can draw simple wills
for them. Let's bring in one of these bachelors. He has no immediate
relatives. For many years he has been active in the Noble Order of
Skunks or some equally honorable fraternity. He is convinced that
the most civic-minded persons living are the officers of his lodge. He
would like to benefit them personally. He wants to leave the residue
of his estate to the four principal officers of his lodge, share and share
alike. That sounds so simple that you think you have to manufacture
some complications to iron out so you will be justified in charging him
a fee. In your effort to be particularly careful you ask him whether
he means the present officers of the lodge or the persons who shall be
officers at some future time. He casually tells you that of course he
means to benefit those who are officers when the payments are being
made. You then get busy to put that into legalistic language. You
are likely to end up with a beautiful residuary clause directing that
"all the rest and residue of my estate be distributed equally among
such persons as shall occupy the four principal offices of Lodge 418,
Noble Order of Skunks, at the time this will is admitted to probate."
It sounds perfect except for one thing. You have again violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities.1o The gift remains contingent until the
will is admitted to probate. There is no absolute assurance as to
when this will take place.
CLAsS GivrS
Another area in which dispositions that appear entirely reasonable
are likely to cause trouble is in the field of class gifts. My rule of
thumb here is not to use class gifts at all unless there is no other way
to achieve what the client wants. If it is a gift to children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews, or other such groups and the children,
grandchildren, nieces, or nephews intended are all in being, list them
by name. You will be less likely to make mistakes than if you attempt
to use the class designations. If not all takers are in being and the
class designation becomes necessary to accomplish the client's wishes,
the instrument should be drafted with extreme care. The deceptive
1OIn the Matter of Campbell, 28 Cal. App. 2d 102, 82 P.2d 22 (1938), 27 CALM.
L. REv. 86 (1938), 37 MicH. L. RFv. 814 (1939). Contra, Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn.

299, 27 AtI. 585 (1893). For an illustration of a statute changing the rule herein
stated see Iri.. ANN. STAT. c. 30, §153a (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1954).
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feature here is that if it is truly a class gift and if there is a possibility
that the vesting as to any one member of the class is too remote, the
entire gift fails."
Suppose you have a client who wishes to leave his property in trust
to pay income to Agnes Story for life, remainder to such of Agnes
Story's children as shall attain thirty years of age. Agnes has three
children at the testator's death. All these will arrive at age thirty, if
at all, within their own lives. However, since Agnes is still alive,
additional children are possible. This possibility invalidates the entire gift. An opposite result was reached in the similar case of Story
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. in Orlando,12 but in that case the gift
was so worded as to justify a construction that the gift to the children
of Agnes was vested, with only the payment postponed until age thirty.
If survival to that age had been made a condition precedent to taking,
it appears that the gift would have been bad.
APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO PARTICULAR TYPES OF
PROPERTY INTERESTS

There is often much fruitless discussion and much resulting con-

fusion centering around the question of what interests are subject to
the rule. If we are to discuss the problems faced by tie general
practitioner and if we are to lay down a few ground rules which will
aid him in properly advising ordinary clients and drafting ordinary
wills and deeds, the soundest suggestion I have to make is that he
start with the proposition that all contingent property interests are
subject to the rule and that all interests must vest within lives in
being and twenty-one years. Exceptions and refinements are to be
dragged in when they are needed for a special purpose. To try to
keep them all in hand as part of your every-day stock in trade is
merely asking for trouble.
One of the intriguing problems often discussed in this connection
is the relationship existing between the Rule Against Perpetuities and
the destructibility rule. It has been suggested that the destructibility
rule has such an effect upon contingent legal remainders that these
3
interests are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.' Don't
aIn re

Wanamaker's Estate, 335 Pa. 241, 6 A.2d 852 (1939); Leake v. Robinson,

2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1917).
12115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
"3See 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §505 (1936).
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you believe it. It is true that a disposition can be made that will be
good whereas if the destructibility rule did not exist it would be bad.
The reason for this situation is, not that the Rule Against Perpetuities
is not applicable in such cases, but rather that it is acutally complied
with. Your client might happen to have a bachelor son named Willie
and a married daughter named Sally. He might want to leave the
old home place to Willie for life with a remainder to the first son of
Sally who reaches 25. Ordinarly such a gift would violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities and be void ab initio. However, here in Florida
where we have that wonderful mechanism known as the destructibility
rule' 4 we can safely say that the remainder to Sally's son will necessarily vest or be destroyed at or before Willie's death. It will vest, if
at all, within lives in being; therefore, the Rule Against Perpetuities
has not been transgressed.
However, let us suppose that your client has a little more faith in
Willie's family prospects even though he is still a bachelor. He wants
to leave the old home place to Willie for life, remainder to Willie's
first son for life, and on the death of Willie's first son to Willie's then
living lineal descendants. Here the gift to lineal decendants is a
legal remainder but it is contingent upon the remaindermen's surviving Willie's first son. That first son is not yet in being. The Rule
Against Perpetuities is violated and the gift fails although if it were
permitted to stand it might never be destroyed by the destructibility
rule. 5
But there are future interests which are not subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for
condition broken fall within this group.1 6 Although no adequate logical explanation for this exception has been found the exception is still
there. Some have explained that these are reversionary interests
which are by their nature vested and for that reason not subject to
the rule. 7 That explanation will not stand examination. If they are
vested they are vested in a purely formal sense and not in any realistic
14As to the operation of the destructibility rule in Florida see Popp v. Bond,
158 Fla. 185, 28 So.2d 259 (1946); Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931);
Smith, Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in Florida, 3 U. FLA. L. R a. 319

(1950).
'5For an analysis of the problem here discussed see 2 SimtS, FumRE INTERS
§503 (1936); SmsaS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF Ftrrua INTFRSTS 378 (1951).
-eInstitution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139
N.E. 301 (1923); Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638, 664 (1938).
176 AmERICAN LAW or PROPERTY §24.3 (Casner ed. 1952).
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view.' If land is conveyed to the X Traction Company "so long as it is
used for railroad purposes but if it ever ceases to be used for railroad
purposes to revert to the grantor and his heirs," a possibility of reverter
is created in the grantor. It is hard to see how this interest in the
grantor can be considered vested in any true sense. It is clearly contingent upon the Traction Company's discontinuing the railroad, an
event which is obviously uncertain.
If the grantor had conveyed the land to the X Traction Company
"so long as it is used for railroad purposes and if it ever ceases to be
used for such purposes then to B and his heirs," the gift to B and his
heirs would have been an executory interest which would have been
void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.19 Just why B's executory
interest is any more obnoxious to public policy than the grantor's
possibility of reverter no one has ever said. The grantor could have
given B the same interest in a slightly different way and have been
well within the rule. He could have retained the possibility of reverter in himself. Ten minutes later he could have conveyed his possibility of reverter to B. 20 Such interests are freely alienable in Florida;
21
at least they are since the decision in Richardson v. Holman.
This completely unjustified rule, which makes the validity of B's
gift depend solely upon its form, has been the subject of much discussion and debate in recent years. It can easily be seen that there
are many circumstances in which the possibility of reverter can tie
up property just as effectively as an executory interest. Yet in the one
instance the tying up is valid and in the other it is invalid. The modem
trend seems to be toward at least a small degree of statutory relief
from this inconsistency. The legislative restriction most often proposed has been that of declaring possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry for condition broken at an end if they fail to become vested
within a certain number of years. 22 The objection most often voiced
against this solution is that it will tend to discourage gifts to charity.
Wealthy donors who are willing to make large gifts to charity often
isAccording to the Restatement, a possibility of reverter is by definition a
contingent interest. 2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §154 (1936).

19Proprietors of Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855).
201t is even possible to transfer the possibility of reverter by the same instrument
that brought it into existence. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645,

91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).
21160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948).
22For examples of such legislation see ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 83, §§la-1c (SmithHurd Cum. Supp. 1954); Mass. Acts 1954, c. 641; R.I. Laws 1953, c. 3213.
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want to tack on provisions for termination of the interest if it ever
ceases to be used in accordance with the wishes of the donor. The Florida legislature addressed itself to this problem in 1951 and passed a statute placing a time limitation upon these interests but providing that
the legislation did not apply to charitable gifts. 23 The statute seemed
to be a happy solution to a difficult problem. For some unexplained
reason the statute also contained a retroactive provision which has
25
24
already been declared unconstitutional as Professor Stephenson
and others predicted. Presumably the other provisions of the statute
will remain in effect, though there may be some doubt as to that.
PowEas

OF APPOINTMENT

I trust that no one will take the few remarks made here as a complete course in the Rule Against Perpetuities. Many areas have not
been mentioned at all and those that have been mentioned have not
been fully developed. Such things as options, splitting of contingencies,
and many others have received no attention whatever. Neither have
I yet discussed the thing which to me is the most fascinating part of
the rule's operation. I am referring to the rule's effect upon powers
of appointment. An adequate treatment of this subject would be a
full-length dissertation within itself, but even a limited discussion of
the Rule Against Perpetuities cannot end without some comment
upon the rule's application to powers of appointment. With reference
to powers there are two basic questions to be asked. Is the power
valid? Is the exercise of the power valid?
If you are drafting an instrument creating a power, your only
concern is with that first question. Is the power valid? If the power
is a general power it is valid if it will become exercisable within the
period of the rule. The fact that an invalid exercise is possible makes
no difference at this point.28 If the power is a special power, not only
must it become exercisable within the period of the rule, but it must
also be so limited that by the very terms of its creation it will be impossible to exercise it at a time beyond the period of the rule.27 If
23FLA. STAT. §689.18 (1953).
24Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So.d 727 (Fla. 1954).
2sConstitutional Inviolability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry
in Florida,6 Mimit L.Q. 162 (1952).
26SIMEs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERBSTs

391-92 (1951).

27Ibid.
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such a remote exercise is possible the power itself is void and no valid
exercise can be accomplished.
When your client is the donee of a valid power you have a further
problem. And here it is worth emphasizing that you should never
draft a will without inquiring into the possibility of a power of appointment existing in the testator. Always ask him if he has a power.
If he does be sure you find out all there is to know about that power
before you draft the will. If he tells you he does not have a power,
you assume that he does and insert a provision for its exercise.28 Such
a provision will do no harm if no powers exist and may save a lot of
disappointment if they do. Remember that your client, even if he
is an educated, well-informed client, might have a power and not know
it.

The perpetuities problem to watch for in the exercise of powers
is that of ascertaining when the period of the rule begins to run.
The exercise of the power is an event upon which property ownership
shifts. The actual passage of title is from the creator of the power
to the appointee. It does not pass through the person exercising the
power. For this reason the period of the rule is counted from the time
of the power's creation, not from its exercise. 29 This is true for all
powers except general powers presently exercisable. In the case of a
general power presently exercisable the property still passes from the
creator of the power to the appointee and the appointment is still
a mere event upon which the property interest shifts. However, the
general power presently exercisable is so similar to property ownership that for purposes of the rule it may be treated as ownership. The
donee of the power can get an absolute title in himself any time he
wishes; consequently, the property is not tied up. For this reason the
courts have counted the period in such cases from the time 0of the
3
exercise of the power rather than from the time of its creation.
CONCLUSION
Although the Rule Against Perpetuities can be stated in a single
sentence, and a comparatively short sentence at that, the brief treat28As to the circumstances under which the power might be exercised by general
clauses in the will without specific reference to the power itself see 5 AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY §23.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
29Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E.2d 487 (1938); Whitby v.
Von Luedecke, [1906] 1 Ch. 783.
3OMifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 Atl. 525 (1888).
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ment presented here has hardly touched the highpoints of the rule's
application. There is much more to be said. But it should be emphasized that all the many ramifications of the rule will tend to fall into
place when the profession becomes willing to treat the rule as a thing
to be used rather than a thing to be feared.
There is no reason why the Rule Against Perpetuities should be
the unconquerable monster that so many of us think it is. The real
monster is the tendency on the part of the profession to regard the
rule as something too technical, too complicated, or too academic to
be understood by practical men of affairs. This unwarranted belief
that the rule is unnecessarily complicated has resulted in many attempts at statutory reform. Efforts have been made to substitute some
other period for what is said to be that undefinable period of lives
in being and twenty-one years. Such experiments have been particularly
prominent in California, Michigan, and New York. California and
Michigan have already returned to the common law rule, and the
situation in New York is such that it would be comical were it not
for the tragedy it has brought to property owners in that state.
Let us remember that the Rule Against Perpetuities is a fundamental part of our concept of private property. Let us further remember that its particular function is to regulate the compromise
between control by the dead on one hand and control by the living
on the other. We can then see some rationality to the period of lives
in being and twenty-one years. If legal history, and especially the
history of efforts at statutory modification in this particular field,
teaches us anything at all, it is that lives in being and twenty-one
years is the most desirable period that has yet been found. It is the
most desirable, not because Gray stated it, not because it is the result
of any profound logic, and not because any wise man or group of
wise men hid away in some ivory tower worked it out, but it is the
most desirable because it is the most workable. And it is the most
workable because it was hammered out on the anvil of human experience. It was put together piece by piece as the common law found
itself responding to the pressures and demands of an ever restless
people. I do not say that it has now arrived at perfection or that it
must, like the law of the Medes and the Persians, never be changed.
I do say that when refinements come they must come from and must
rest upon a broad base of human experience. If they spring from any
other source and if they rest upon any other foundation they will
necessarily prove unworkable.
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